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is two practices (i.e., knowledge (prajñ?) and means (up?ya)). Therefore, in the PBhU we can regard 1) 
meditation on bodhicitta or 2) knowledge and means as the cause of attainment of the final stage. How, 
then, does he associate these two ideas? Jñ?nak?rti defines prasth?nacitta as the mental foundation for 
practitioners who strive to collect supplies (sa?bh?ra) such as giving (d?n?di) for entering into practice 
(pratipatti). This definition is based on Kamala??la’s definition. In Jñ?nak?rti’s definition, the important 
point is that sa?bh?ra is defined as d?n?di, which are connected with up?ya. Therefore, we can 
consider that prasth?nacitta is connected with up?ya. And Jñ?nak?rti regards prajñ? as the cause for 
ascertaining the right state of up?ya.  
Jñ?nak?rti’s definition of prasth?nacitta was based on Kamala??la’s definition. In Jñ?nak?rti’s 
understanding, sa?bh?ra is limited to that which is relevant to up?ya. From this point, we can 
understand that prasth?nacitta is connected with up?ya in Jñ?nak?rti’s PBhU. This understanding is not 
found in Kamala??la’s BhKr I. 
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?r?har?a (ca. 12th) argued that Brahman is self-luminous (svaprak??a) in the Kha??ana-
kha??akh?dya (Kh), which he wrote from the position of the Advaita Ved?nta. In this case, he proved 
that Brahman is self-luminous by proving that cognition (vijñ?na), which is the nature of Brahman, is 
self-luminous. 
In the Kh, the demonstration of cognition as being self-luminous mainly consists of criticism of 
the Ny?ya school, the opponent, and at the beginning he proves positively that cognition is 
self-luminous. He replaces the self-luminousness of cognition with its being self-proved. Further, he 
considers it to be established through a process of self-luminosity. It is proved as follows that cognition 
is established through a process of self-awareness. 
Experientially, when knowledge arises, there is for no one who seeks to know the object any 
doubt (sa??aya) or error (viparyaya) or the valid cognition that cognition does not exist 
(vyatirekapram?). This implies that the cognition which exists in them is known correctly. By 
converting this empirical fact into a logical relationship, it is concluded that the cognition is known 
correctly when there is neither doubt nor error nor the valid cognition that it does not exist regarding 
that which exists in those who seek to know the object that is wished to be known. Otherwise, there 
would be doubt or error or the valid cognition that the cognition does not exist for those without the 
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disturbances of drowsiness, etc. But this cannot happen, and so the above logical relationship is 
established. Thus, when the cognition perceives itself, it is proved that it is settled because of its being 
self-awareness. 
The above demonstration incorporates the self-recognition (svasa?vedana) theory of the 
Yog?c?ra school and the self-proved truth theory (svata?pr?m??yav?da) among truth theories, and this 
is a distinctive feature of ?r?har?a’s demonstration of cognition as being self-luminous.
